The late great Egyptologist, Jan Assmann has been a huge boon to my engagement with philosophy and spirituality. In his books I discovered that – in contrast to what was either explicitly taught or just assumed in my western Christian upbringing – in remote antiquity, at the very dawn of so-called western civilization in Egypt, profound and highly developed theosophical insights already abounded – that is, prior to influence from Judeo-Christian tradition. In fact, the opposite dependency could be plausibly attributed. What I want to outline briefly here is a structure of metaphysical strategies which weaves together aspects of various systems beginning with ancient Egyptian theism (admittedly privileging Buddhism which is by no means the only way these strategies could be structured)
Assmann tells us that the earlier, pre Akhenaten era, Egyptian theology was one of a unity of source; the god, often referred to as Amun-Re, was the first cause, the originator of the universe. In this role he fulfilled the so-called “cosmological argument” of classical theism. He arose by himself, of himself (self-caused) and generated all things from himself through his personified aspects (the other gods who were of a lower order than he). But along with being the first cause in a temporal sense, he could also be seen to fulfill Aristotle’s argument for an unmoved-mover in that all the multivariate motions and changes which constitute universal life owe their existence to the activity of this god, embodied as the principle of light. This is an objectification of unity of source.
This conception of unity of source and causation can be seen (along with many other subsequent mythological and religious iterations) again in the contemporary myth (by myth, I don’t mean a pejorative) of the Big Bang theory which traces back through time to a source and also describes the principles which underlie phenomenal change and development.
The Buddhist view of the objective and temporal line of succession and causation, denotes it “dependent origination”. There is no first cause in this conception; any notions of first, second, greater, lesser etc are relevant only to the world as it is grasped as an object for a conditioned subject (in other words, the notions and designations of apparently objective things in terms of priority, temporal, ontological etc arise only in a conditioned, limited subjective mind- ie, human). The unmoved mover need not therefore be shifted to some other objective ontological level (such as a god or a transcendent principle). Instead, unending, beginningless interpenetrating lines of causation can be read from the inherent nature of existence itself, which is present in both the objective and subjective aspects (as Emptiness or Sunyata.
But the Egyptian theology developed further from the concept of a unity of source and causation. By the Ramseside era, beyond the short lived and highly disruptive absolute monotheism of Akhenaten’s revolution, there had developed a theology which Assmann calls “a theology of manifestation” as opposed to origination and creation. Here, the unity is still one of source and causation, but the emphasis is no longer on a purely objective and in a temporal sense. The universe is not a creation of a single god who discloses his primacy through the rays of light, but the manifestation of an invisible and hidden god who animates the world – including humans, animals and other lesser beings called gods- from within. This is the ‘ba’ theology. Ba ordinarily denoted the core aspect of personhood for the Egyptians, often translated as soul. This god (whom they called Amun: the hidden of name) was the soul of the universe, the one noumenon of all phenomena which were his expressions. This is a subjectification of the unity of source. This is extremely close to the Brahmanical notion of Atman, the supreme self of existence, identical to Brahman, the supreme principle of creation.
How could this then relate to Buddhism, who’s central tenants include an apparent rejection of the ‘atman’ of Brahmanism? The answer could be seen to lie with Buddhist skepticism for any claims of absolute nature in a purely objective ‘thing’ or phenomenon; which even such a mystical entity as atman could be described as being. Ba, as an equivalent to atman would therefore also be viewed by Buddhists as a suspiciously objectified ‘thing’. The Buddhist argument is one for the total relativizing and interdependency of any phenomena, subjective or objective, and therefore (if any term at all is applicable) for the ultimate non-dual nature of reality which can not be grasped, but can be experienced. It’s a radicalisation of the basic insight of both Brahmanism and the Egyptian theology of manifestation. It therefore also includes (though relegated again to the level of the phenomenal) the original theology of unity of source and causation. The Buddhist ‘sunyata’ is absolute in being neither the objective, nor subjective if by subject is meant ‘ego’. It could be described as absolute subjectivity, as ultimate noumenon but only if ordinary notions of subject and object are discarded.